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NOTES

with the practice of drugless healing, the proper remedy does not lie in
holding the "school of healing" rule inapplicable to such schools of healing.
Most cases which so hold, although probably correct from the standpoint
of the "equities" involved, seem lacking in logical reasoning. It is submitted that the proper remedy lies in a revision of the statutes. A partial
solution to this problem may be the adoption of a statute similar to that
of Wisconsin which prohibits certain classes of drugless healers from
treating any specific disease except on the advice of a physician." A further
legislative solution would be the enactment of a "basic science act" requiring applicants for a chiropractic license to first pass an examination
in the basic sciences before they are permitted to be examined by the
chiropractic examining board.3 5 Although the Wyoming court has not yet
been confronted with the problem of the liability of chiropratcors for malpractice, it is submitted that the Wyoming statutes are in need of revision
so that if such a case does arise, the court would be relieved of the controversy concerning the merits of the various branches of the healing arts.
JERALD E. DuKEs

A STUDY OF THE WYOMING MISCEGENATION STATUTES
The first ban on interracial marriage was passed in Maryland in
1661.1 Since that time, forty states have followed with statutory bans on
interracial marriages. 2 Twenty-nine states still have such prohibitions.3
34.
?,5.

Wis. Stat. § 147.185 (1949).
The sciences generally considered as basic are anatomy, physiology, chemistry,
bacteriology and pathology. According to Memorandum, Bureau of Legal Medicine
and Legislation, American Medical Association (1950), eighteen of the states and
of the District of Columbia presently have such statutes. It is interesting to note
that neither California nor Wyoming, with their large ratios of chiropractors, have
such statutes.

1.

"Foreasmuch as divers free-born English women, forgetful of their free conditions,
and to the disgrace of our nation, do inter-marry with negro slaves, by which divers
suits may arise, touching the issue of such women, and a great damage doth befall
the master of such negroes, for preservation whereof for deterring such free-born
women from such shameful matches, be it enacted: that whatsoever free-born
woman shall intermary with any slave, from and after the last day of the present
assembly, shall serve the master of such slave during the life of her husband; and
that all the issues of such free-born women, so married, shall be slaves . . .
And be it further enacted: That all the issues of English, or other free-born women,
that have already married negroes, shall serve the master of their parents, till they
be thirty years of age and no longer." Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1637-1664,
pp. 533-534; see also, Brackett, The Negro in Maryland, pp. 32-33; Reuter, Race
Mixture, p. 78.
Alabama, Ala. Code § 14-360 (1940); Arizona, Ariz. Code Ann. §§ 63-107 and 63108 (1939) ; Arkansas, Ark. Stat. § 55-104 ( 1947) ; California, Cal. Civil Code § 60
(1937) (held unconstitutional in Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948);
Colorado, Colo. Stat. Ann. § 107-2 (1935); Delaware, Del. Code § 13-101 (1953);
Florida, Fla. Stat. §§ 1.01, 741.1!, 741.12 (1953); Georgia, Code of Ga. Ann. §§
53-106, 53-312 (1933) ; Idaho, Idaho Code § 32-206 (1947) ; Indiana, Burns, Ind. Stat.
Ann. §§ 44-104, 44-105 (1933) (Baldwin's Ind. Stat. Ann. § 5619 (1934)); Iowa
(omitted in 1851) ; Kansas (omitted Laws v. 49 (1857)); Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 402.070 (1953); Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. § 9-201 (1950); Maine, Act of 1786,
repealed by Laws 1883 p. 16; Maryland, Md. Flack's Code § 27-466 (1951); Massachusetts, repealed by Acts 1843 c. 5; Michigan, amended by Act 23, Session Laws
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Six of these states have constitutional bans as well as statutory provisions
prohibiting such marriages. 4 However, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Washington have repealed the miscegenation statutes which were once in
effect in those states; 5 and the Supreme Court of California has held its
statute unconstitutional. 6 While all twenty-nine states which have miscegenation statutes have provisions barring marriage of a White to a
Negro, 7 twelve states also have provisions which would bar marriage of
Whites to various classifications of Asiatics. s Three states in their statutes
bar marriages of Whites to "Africans," and have no explicit mention of
Negroes; 9 this type of statute would technically apply to the Dutch Afrikanders as well as to the Negro.' 0
While all of the statutes are basically similar, some have very comprehensive restrictions. As an example, Georgia has a very explicit statute
as to what racial background would qualify a person as a member of the
White race, and then, in another statute bans marriage of Whites to
Negroes, Indians, Malayans, Mongolians, Asiatic Indians, West Indians, or
Mulattoes."' Some of the statutes have somewhat strange provisions:
North Dakota includes Koreans under its ban; 12 Arizona has a provision
banning marriage between -Whites and Hindus; 13 Nevada prohibits marriage with Ethiopeans; 1 4 and Montana and Nebraska ban Chinese and
Japanese from marrying Whites; 15 Colorado's statute bans miscegenous
marriages, and then makes an exception of marriages between people living

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

1883 (Mich. Comp. Laws § 551.6 (1948), validates all marriages entered into between white and African or person of African descent); Mississippi, Miss. Code
§ 459 (1942) ; Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.020 (1949) ; Montana, Mont. Rev. Code
§§ 48-106 thru 48-108 (1947) ; Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-103 (1943) ; Nevada,
Nev. Comp. Laws § 10197 (1929); New Mexico, (repealed by Laws 1886 p. 90)
North Carolina, N. C. Star. § 51-3 (1943) ; North Dakota, N. Dak. Rev. Code §§
14-0304, 14-0305 (1953) ; Ohio (repealed by Laws 1887 p. 34) ; Oklahoma, Okla.
Stat. tit. 43 § 12-3 (1951); Oregon, Ore. Comp. Laws § 63-102 (1940) ; Pennsylvania,
passed an Act in 1725, Turner, The Negro in Pennsylvania, the author could find
no further record of this legislation; Rhode Island, (repealed by Acts Jan. Sess. 1881,
p. 108); South Carolina, S. C. Code § 20-7 (1952); South Dakota, S. Dak. Code §
14.0106 (1939); Tennessee, Tenn. Code § 8409 (1932); Texas, Vernon's Texas
Stat. § 4607 (1948) ; Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 40-1-2 (1943) ; Virginia, Va. Code
§§ 20-54, 20-57 (1950); Washington, (repealed by Laws 1867, pp. 47-48) ; West
Virginia, W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 48-1-19, 48-2-1 (1949) ; Wyoming, Wyo. Comp. Stat.
§§ 50-108, 50-109 (1945).
See note 2, supra.
Alabama, Ala. Const. Art. 4 § 102; Florida, Fla. Const. Art. 16 § 24; Mississippi,
Miss. Const. Art. 14 § 263; North Carolina, N. C. Const. Art. 14 § 8; South Carolina,
S. C. Const. Art 3 § 33; Tennessee, Tenn. Const. Art. 11 § 14.
See note 2, supra.
Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
See note 2, supra.
Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming; see note 2, supra.
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas; see note 2, supra.
One can imagine the consternation such an application would cause. Dr. Milan and
his "white supremacy" followers.
Code of Ga. Ann. §§ 53-312, 53-106 (1933).
N. Dak. Rev. Code § 14-0304 (1943).
Ariz. Code Ann. § 63-107 (1939).
Nev. Comp. Laws § 10197 (1929).
Mont. Rev. Code §§ 48-106 thru 48-108 (1947); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-103 (1943).
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in that portion of the state acquired from Mexico, if the marriage is valid
according to the law of Mexico.' 6 Under the Arizona statute,' 7 barring
anyone with Caucasian blood from marrying a Negro, Hindu, Malay,
Mongolian, or Indian or their descendants, anyone with any mixture of
Caucasian and prohibited racial descent would be precluded from marrying at all. Since he would be "of Caucasian blood," marriage to the races
set out in the statute would be prohibited; and since he would be of the
blood of the prohibited races also, he could not marry a White. This
statute is startling similar to Hitler's concept of the "pure Ayran."
The Wyoming miscegenation law is composed of two sections."" The
first, section 50-108, will be referred to as the prohibition section, and the
second, section 50-109, will be referred to as the enforcement section. These
statutes are both derived from one Act, chapter 57 of the Wyoming Session
Laws of 1913, which was originally introduced as House Bill 153 of that
year and was passed February 22, 1913, to take effect immediately upon its
passage. 19 The present statutes are unchanged from their original form.
The Wyoming prohibition section reads:
All marriages of white persons with Negroes, Mulattoes,
Mongolians or Malays hereafter contracted
in the state of Wyo20
ming are and shall be illegal and void.

And the Wyoming enforcement section is:
Whosoever shall knowingly contract marriage in fact contrary to the prohibitions in the preceding section, and whosoever
shall knowingly solemnize any such marriage shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon being convicted thereof, shall
lie punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars, nor
more than one thousand dollars, or imprisonment of not less than
one year nor more than five years,2 or both, at the discretion of
the court which shall try the cause. '
The Wyoming prohibition provision is characterized by its brevity;
evidently the legislature did not see fit to define further any of the classifications set forth. Nor have there been any Wyoming cases dealing with
racial intermarriages or interpreting this statute. However, when the
Whyoming courts first deal with this problem, they will be faced with the
formidable question of interpreting the prohibition provision. The very
brevity of the statute gives rise to the largest problem-who comes within
the prohibition of the statute?
The first question that arises is as to who is a "White" within the
meaning of the statute. Even those states which have formulated statutory
definitions are not in agreement. Georgia with its very extensive definition
provision sets out that a "White" includes only those persons who have no
16.
17.

18.

Colo. Stat. Ann. § 107-2 (1935).
Ariz. Code Ann. §§ 63-107, 63-108 (1939).

20.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. §§ 50-108, 50-109 (1945).
,Vyo. Sess. Laws 1913 c. 57 H 1, 2, 3, 4.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 50-108 (1945).

21.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 50-109 (1945).

19.
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ascertainable trace of the prohibited intermixture in their blood line.22
The Arizona statute prohibits anyone with "Caucasian blood" from marrying the other races enumerated.23 Virginia states that a "White" is a person
with no admixture except 1/16 or less of American Indian.2 4 Many other
states in their statues treat as "White" anyone with 1 or less of any of
the other prohibited races; 25 Oregon sets it at 1.26
In those states which do not have a statutory definition of who is a
"White," the court decisions construing the provision are even more
divergent than the statutory definitions. An Ohio decision held that one
having a preponderance of Caucasian blood is a "White" within the meaning of the statute. 27 The Oklahoma court in the case of Scott v. Epperson
said:
Indians were and are generally referred to as such, or as red
men. We cannot presume that they are included within the term,
"white persons," but must presume that the expression was used
in its ordinary acceptation, which according to the lexicographers,
means persons having a light complexion as members of the
Caucasian race;
opposed to negro and also the red, yellow, and
2
brown races. 8

The same problems arise in determining who is a Negro, Mongolian, or
Malay. The term Mulatto technically means, the child of parents one of
whom is pure Negro and the other pure White, but by common usage the
term has come to mean any mixture of Negro with other races. 29 In In
re Stark's Estate, 30 the California court held that one with 1/ Negro blood
was a Mulatto. In State v. Davis and Hanna, the South Carolina Supreme
Court said:
I do not know how that we can lay down any other rule than
to give what appears to be the popular meaning of the word;
to wit, that where there is a distinct and visible admixture of
Negro blood the person is to be denominated a mulatto, or person
of color . . . the witness was a quadroon, and such3 an one is

clearly to be accounted a mulatto, or person of color. '

It would seem that since the enforcement provision of the Wyoming
law carries a criminal sanction, the so-called rule of strict construction
of criminal statutes would come into play. Under this construction the
statute would bar only a pure Caucasian from marrying those descended
solely from a prohibited racial stock, or a Mulatto in the technical sense
of the word.
22.

Code of Ga. Ann. § 53-312 (1933).

23.
24.
25.
26.

See note 16, supra.
See note 1, supra.
I/8: Alabama, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah; See note 1, supra.
Ore. Comp. Laws § 63-102 (1940).

27.

Anderson v. Millikan, 9 Ohio St. 568, 570 (1858).

28.

141 Okla. 41, 284 Pac. 19, 20 (1930).

29.

Webster's New International Dictionary (Unabridged) 2d ed. 1936, p. 1608; Black's

30.
3t.

48 Cal.App.2d 209, 119 P.2d 961
2 Bailey 559, 560 (S.C. 1831).

Law Dictionary 4th ed. 1951 p. 1166; Thurman v. State, 18 Ala. 276 (1850).
(1941).
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The second problem which could confront the court is whether tile
children of a miscegenous marriage performed in Wyoming are legitimate
or illegitimate. In the other types of marriage which are declared to be
void in Wyoming,3 2 there are specific provisions stating the issue of the
marriage is either legitimate or is illegitimate.3 3 However, there is no
provision dealing with the issue of a marriage which is void because miscegenous, nor is there any general provision as to the children born of void
marriages. This may be a matter of only minor importance, except to
those adversely affected-the children-who are the innocent by-products
of miscegenous marriages.
In addition to the stigma of illegitimacy there is also the question of
whether the child or spouse could inherit. The Wyoming statute on inheritance provides that an illegitimate child can inherit from his mother,
but in order for him to inherit from his father there must be a subsequent
34
(valid) marriage in which the father recognizes the child as his own.
There is no provision of this statute which deals with the issue of a void
marriage. Therefore, if issue is illegitimate, such issue could not inherit
from the father. Neither is there any statutory provision as to inheritance
by a "spouse" tinder a void marriage. Therefore, the usual rule of "no
marriage no spouse" would probably apply.
The third problem which a miscegenation statute such as that of
A,Vyoming would raise is the status in Wyoming of a miscegenous marriage
performed in another jurisdiction. This problem has several aspects.
The first to be considered is whether XVyoming by any statutory provision
has invalidated a miscegenous marriage performed in another jurisdiction.
Since XVyoming has a statute recognizing marriages in other jurisdictions
if valid where performed,3 it is probable that if residents of Wyoming
entered into a miscegenous marriage in another jurisdiction where such
marriages are valid that the union would be recognized as valid in Wyoruing. Although the XVyoming Statute says if valid "by the laws of the
countriy"3
(italics added), the California Court in construing an almost
identical statute of that state held in the case of McDonald v. McDonald
that such a statute applied to sister states.3 7 This view is strengthened
by the fact that the prohibition staute in Wyoming refers only to marriages performed in Wyoming, "All miscegenous marriages . . . contracted
in the state of Wyoming are and shall be illegal and void .
3.8..
3 2.
33.

Wyo. Comp. Stat.
Legitimate, Wyo.
or idiocy of one
Illegitimate. Wyo.
sanguinity.

34.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 6-2507

o5.

"All marriage contracts without this state, which would be valid by the laws of

36.
37.
38.

the country in which the same were contracted, shall be valid in all courts and
places in this state." Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 50-118 (1945).
Ibid.
6 Cal.2d 457, 58 P.2d 163, 164 (1936).
See note 19, supra.

§ 3-5901 (1945).
Comp. Stat. § 3-5924 (1945), Marriage void because of insanity
of the parties, and § 3-5925, Marriage void because bigamous.
Comp. Stat. § 3-5926 (194.), Marriage void on account of con(1945).
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The second aspect of this conflict of laws problem to be considered is
whether the marriage is valid in the state in which performed. The marriage could be invalid in the foreign jurisdiction for either of two reasons:
first, the foreign jurisdiction may also have a miscegenation statute which
covers the particular union in question, or second, if the parties are residents
of a state which has a miscegenation statute, such as Wyoming, and if the
foreign jurisdiction in which the marriage is performed has the Uniform
Marriage Evasion Act, then by the terms of that Act the marriage is void
even though the foreign jurisdiction has no ban on such marriages.30
Therefore, persons attempting to avoid the Wyoming prohibition by being
married in another state should look to see whether that state has either an
applicable miscegenation statute, or the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act.
Since the XVyoming statute provides that subsequent marriage plus recog40
nition removes an illegitimate child's disability to inherit from his father,
the disability of children of a miscegenous marriage performed in Wyoming
could be removed by a valid marriage elsewhere, if care is taken to avoid
the aforementioned pitfalls in the subsequent marriage. The same would
apply in removing a wife's disability to inherit, and in leagalizing the
cohabitation of the parties.
The final question is whether the Wyoming miscegenation statute is
constitutional. The great majority of cases which have dealt with this
problem have upheld miscegenation statutes. 41 Only two decisions have
been found in which miscegenation statutes have been held unconstitu43
tional, 42 and one of these was later overruled.
The United States Supreme Court has never directly ruled upon this
question. However, in the case of Pace v. Alabama decided in 1882 the
Court upheld an Alabama statute which imposed a more severe penalty
for fornication when the offense was committed by a Negro and a White
44
than if the offense were committed by two members of the same race.
The two grounds which have been most generally relied upon in upholding these statutes has been that marriage is a social relationship which
is of great interest to the state and therefore subject to reasonable regulation by the state,45 and that the statutes do not discriminate because they
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, 9 U.L.A. 479 (1942).
See note 33, supra.
Ex Parte Francois, 9 Fed. Cas. 5047 (W. D. Tex. 1879); Georgia v. Tutty, 41 Fed.
753, 7 L.R.A. 50 (S.D. Ga. 1890); Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 29 Am.Rep. 739
(1877), overruling Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 17 Am.Rep. 34 (1872) ; Kirby v.
Kirby, 24 Ariz. 9, 206 Pac. 405 (1922); Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977
(1895) ; See Note 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 532 (1906); Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d
120 (10th Cir. 1944); Jackson v. Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942); Estate
of Fred Pacquet, 101 Ore. 393, 200 Pac. 911 (1921).
Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 17 Am.Rep. 34 (1872) ; Perez et al v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d
17, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 17 Am.Rep. 34 (1872) overruled by Green v. State, 58
Ala. 190, 29 Am.Rep. 739 (1877).
106 U.S. 583, 1 S.Ct. 637, 27 L.Ed. 207 (1882).
Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 29 Am.Rep. 739 (1877); Kirby v. Kirby, 24 Ariz. 9, 206
Pac. 405 (1922) ; Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57,31 S.W. 977 (1895).
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apply to whites as well as to the other races. 46 The trend of the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court has been toward a more stringent
application of the discrimination-prohibiting provisions of the United
States Constitution.47 The Court's decision in Shelly v. Kraemer,48 holding
that racial restrictive covenants were no more enforceable because of the
fact that they could be used against Whites as well as other races, was
hailed as rebutting the argument that there is no discrimination by such
statutes because they apply equally to the White and other races. In the
recent school segregation cases, the Court stated that education is certainly
of paramount interest to the states, but for that very reason discriminaion
cannot be allowed. 49 The Court has held that marriage is a fundamental
right of the individual,5 0 and has stated that classifications made on the
basis of color or race alone are suspect. 5'
Of the two decisions which have been rendered holding miscegenation
statutes unconstitutional, Burns v. The State of Alabama need not be considered since it was expressly overruled in 1877, only five years after it was
decided.' 2 The second case is Perez v. Lippold, a California case decided
in 1948.53

This decision, although weakened by the fact that the majority

did not concur in any opinion, was based on the grounds that marriage is
a fundamental right of the individual and is not subject to regulation by
the state in the absence of a showing of clear and present danger. The
majority then argued in convincing fashion that according to scientific
research there is no clear and present danger presented by interracial
marriage. The majority also held that the statute (similar to the Wyoming
prohibition provision) was void as being too indefinite and uncertain for
application. The court said that marriage is an individual right such as
is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, since the right to
marry is inseparably linked with the right to choose a partner, the separate
but equal doctrine is not applicable because a statute which impairs the
right to choose a partner necessarily impairs the right to marry.
46.

State v. Hairston, 63 N. C. 439 (1869); Jackson v. Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 199, 124

P.2d 240 (1942); In re Estate of Fred Pacquet, 101 Ore. 393, 399, 200 Pac. 911, 913
(1921).

47.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

The court has in the past seven years held that: 1. The state courts cannot enforce
racial restrictive covenants, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 97 L.Ed. 3
(1948); 2. Racial grounds are not sufficient to support a classification barring
Japanese fishermen from fishing in the coastal waters of California, Takahashi v.
Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed 1478 (1948) ; 3. The

barring of negroes from juries is a denial of equal protection (in an opinion which
emphatically reaffirmed previous holdings to that effect) , Patton v. Mississippi,
332 U.S. 463, 68 S.Ct. 184, 92 L.Ed. 76 (1947); 4. Segregation of races in public
schools is unconstitutional in that it denies equal protection of the laws, Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct.
681, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).
Ibid.
See note 46, supra.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R.
1446 (1923).
Railway Mail Assn. v. Crosi, 326 U.S. 88, 94, 65 S.Ct. 1483, 1487, 89 L.Ed. 2072
(1945).
See note 42, supra.
See note 41, supra.
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The constitutional question is an open one so far as the Supreme Court
of Wyoming is concerned. As just demonstrated, there is ample authority
that the statutes are valid, but there is also logical enlightened authority
that the statutes are unconstitutional and hence void.
From he standpoint of physical anthropolgy there is also another
criticism of the statutes in that the classifications are often on a cultural
or geographical basis rather than on the racial basis upon which they
purport to be founded.
In terms of legislative trends the existence of the statutes is inconsistent
with the policy of the Wyoming Legislature evidenced in recent years.
Th 1955 Wyoming Legislature repealed a statute which had provided for
optional segregation in Wyoming schools.5 4 The same legislature adopted
"Equal Rights" as the state motto.55 When a Civil Rights Bill was introduced 6 it was defeated on the grounds that tolerance is desirable but it
cannot be forced by legislation.
The Wyoming statutes probably serve little purpose other than as a
source of harassment and uncertainty to those who have violated the provisions. The writer has not been advised of any prosecutions which have
been instituted thereunder in Wyoming, and in the absence of additional
circumstances it is believed that few county attorneys would be disposed
to prosecute. As pointed out, the statutes can probably be avoided if the
couple marries in a state which has neither a miscegenation statute nor tht
Uniform Marriage Evasion Act. This leaves the prohibition of the statut
as a burden only upon those who lack the money to go out of the state to
be married, those who do not know of the existence of the statute or how
to avoid its provisions, and those who are not concerned with the inheritance of property. As a deterrent to interracial marriages, the statutes are
probable failures. As Edward Byron Reuter has observed in his book,
Race Mixture, "the legislation itself probably has no effect whatever upon
the rate of racial intermixture."' 7
\\ILLIA-M E. FOSTER

NET WORTH METHOD OF PROSECUTION FOR TAX EVASION
Determination of a taxpayer's income by indirect means in a tax
evasion prosecution has increased considerably in the past few years. In
very few recent cases has unreported income been shown by specific or
direct proof of unrecoided transactions. The so-called "net worth"
method of proof seems to be the indirect means most frequently used by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It is apparent that they apply it now in
54.
55.
56.
57.

Sess. Laws 1955 c. 36.
Sess. Laws 1955 c. 102.
H. B. 86 Introduced Wyoming State Legislature, January 20, 1955.
Reuter, Race Mixture, 103.

